On Optimality of Allowing Collusion
On Optimality of Allowing Collusion
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In our eReader you can find the full English version of the book. Read On Optimality of Allowing Collusion Online - link to read the book on full screen. Our eReader also allows you to upload and read Pdf, Txt, ePub and fb2 books. In the Mini eReder on the page below you can quickly view all pages of the book - Read Book On Optimality of Allowing Collusion
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Next, we assume that the auditor is strategic with probability less than 1 and that the principal does not attempt to deter collusion by rewarding the auditor when he reveals incriminating information. While a non-strategic auditor will truthfully convey this information to the principal, a strategic auditor will collude with the manager. This extreme case (c=l; no deterrence) will help us to defme the indifference locus between allowing and deterring collusion, and the indifference locus will ...separate the region of the parameter space in which allowing collusion is strictly prefered from the region in which deterrence is strictly prefered.
The important decision the principal faces whenever he decides to hire an auditor is whether he is better off allowing or deterring collusion between the manager and the auditor. If he decides to deter collusion, he will have to pay the auditor a reward at least as large as the bribe proposed by the manager. If he allows collusion he will not pay any reward, but a strategic auditor will never report that the manager should be punished.
What to read after On Optimality of Allowing Collusion?
You can find similar books in the "Read Also" column, or choose other free books by Fred Kofman to read onlineMoreLess
To quickly assess the difficulty of the text, read a short excerpt:
Next, we assume that the auditor is strategic with probability less than 1 and that the principal does not attempt to deter collusion by rewarding the auditor when he reveals incriminating information. While a non-strategic auditor will truthfully convey this information to the principal, a strategic auditor will collude with the manager. This extreme case (c=l; no deterrence) will help us to defme the indifference locus between allowing and deterring collusion, and the indifference locus will ...separate the region of the parameter space in which allowing collusion is strictly prefered from the region in which deterrence is strictly prefered.
The important decision the principal faces whenever he decides to hire an auditor is whether he is better off allowing or deterring collusion between the manager and the auditor. If he decides to deter collusion, he will have to pay the auditor a reward at least as large as the bribe proposed by the manager. If he allows collusion he will not pay any reward, but a strategic auditor will never report that the manager should be punished.
What to read after On Optimality of Allowing Collusion?
You can find similar books in the "Read Also" column, or choose other free books by Fred Kofman to read onlineMoreLess
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