The book Single Transferable Vote Resists Strategic Voting was written by author J J John Joseph Bartholdi Here you can read free online of Single Transferable Vote Resists Strategic Voting book, rate and share your impressions in comments. If you don't know what to write, just answer the question: Why is Single Transferable Vote Resists Strategic Voting a good or bad book?
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. , m, 12m voters with preference (gi, w, c, . . . ); • For each i = 1, . . . , m: 6m + Ai — 5 voters with preference (6, -, (, -, w, c, . . . ) and, for each of the three j such that j £ S, 2 voters with preference (b, dj, w, c, .. . ); • For each i = 1, . . . , m: 6m + Ai — 1 voters with preference (b, bi, w, c, . .. ) and 2 voters with preference (b, d, w, c, . . . ); • For each i = 1, . . . , m: 6m + 4z — 3 voters with preference (a, , u/, c, . . . ); 1 voter with preference (a, -, 6 t -, u...;, c, . .. ); and 2 voters with preferences (a, a, u;, c, ... ); • For each i = 1, . . . , m: 6m + 4i — 3 voters with preference (ai, g, w, c, ... ); 1 voter with preference (a, 6, -, ii;, c, . .. ); and 2 voters with preferences (ai, ai, w, c, ... ); Now we consider the election. Votes for c and w. Initially c has 12m votes and u> has 12m— 1 votes. Except for the 12m initial supporters of c, all voters rank c immediately below w. Thus c cannot get another vote until w is eliminated.
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